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ABSTRACT
In this work, we propose a probabilistic value-passing CCS
(Calculus of Communicating System) approach to model
and analyze a typical network security scenario with one at-
tacker and one defender. By minimizing this model with re-
spect to probabilistic bisimulation and abstracting it through
graph-theoretic methods, two algorithms based on backward
induction are designed to compute Nash Equilibrium strat-
egy and Social Optimal strategy respectively. For each al-
gorithm, the correctness is proved and an implementation is
realized. Finally, this approach is illustrated by a detailed
case study.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—
Security and protection
General Terms
Security
Keywords
Network security; Nash equilibrium strategy; Social optimal
strategy; Reactive model; Probabilistic value passing CCS
1. INTRODUCTION
Modeling and analysis of network security has been a hot
research spot in the network security domain. It has been
studied from different perspectives. Among them are two
main approaches, one based on game-theoretic methods [15],
and one based on (probabilistic) process algebra [13, 22, 4].
In the later 1990’s, game theoretic methods were introduced
for modeling and analyzing network security [21]. These
methods consist in applying different kinds of games to dif-
ferent network scenarios with one attacker and one defender
[17]. Roughly speaking, static game is a one-shot game in
which players choose action simultaneously. It is often used
to model the scenarios in which the attacker and defender
have no idea on the action chosen by the adversary (for
instance the scenario of information warfare), and to com-
pute the best strategy for players in a quantitative way [9].
Stochastic game is often used to model the scenarios which
involve probabilistic transitions through states of network
systems according to the actions chosen by the attacker and
the defender [10, 12]. Markov game is an extension of game
theory to MDP-like environments [23]. It is often used to
model the scenarios in which the future offensive-defensive
behaviors will impact on the present action choice of attacker
and defender [24]. In Bayesian game, the characteristics
about other players is incomplete and players use Bayesian
analysis in predicting the outcome [7]. A dynamic Bayesian
game with two players, called Signaling game, is often used
to model intrusion detection in mobile ad-hoc networks and
to analyze Nash equilibrium in a qualitative way [16]. On
the other hand, as far as we know, (probabilistic) process
algebra approach focus on verifying network security proto-
cols. For example, in the earlier 1980’s, a simple version of
the alternating bit protocol in ACPτ (Algebra of Commu-
nicating Processes with silent actions) was verified [2]. For
describing and analyzing cryptographic protocols, the spi
calculus, an extension of the pi calculus, was designed [1].
Recently, a generalization of the bisimilarity pseudo-metric
based on the Kantorovich lifting is proposed, this metric al-
lows to deal with a wider class of properties such as those
used in security and privacy [3].
In this paper, we propose a probabilistic value-passing CCS
(PVCCS) approach for modeling and analyzing a typical
network security scenario with one attacker and one de-
fender. A network system is supposed to be composed of
three participants: one attacker, one defender and the net-
work environment which is the hardware and software ser-
vices of the network under consideration. We consider all
possible behaviors of the participants at each state of the
system as processes and assign each state with a process de-
scribing all possible interactions currently performed among
the participants. In this way we establish a network state
transition model, often called reactive model in the litera-
ture [22], based on PVCCS. By minimizing this model with
respect to probabilistic bisimulation and abstracting it via
graph-theoretic methods, two algorithms based on backward
ar
X
iv
:1
50
7.
06
76
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
4 J
ul 
20
15
induction are designed to compute Nash Equilibrium Strat-
egy (NES) [11, 8, 20] and Social Optimal Strategy (SOS)
[14, 6] respectively. The former represents a stable strat-
egy of which neither the attacker nor the defender is willing
to change the current situation, and the latter is the pol-
icy to minimize the damages caused by the attacker. For
each algorithm, the correctness is proved and an implemen-
tation is realized. This approach is illustrated by a detailed
case study on an example introduced in [12]. The example
describes a local network connected to Internet under the
assumption that the firewall is unreliable, and the operating
system on the machine is insufficiently hardening, and the
attacker has chance to pretend as a root user in web server,
stealing or damaging data stored in private file server and
private workstation. The major contributions of our work
are:
• establish a reactive model based on PVCCS for a typi-
cal network security scenario which is usually modeled
via perfect and complete information games.
• minimize the state space of network system via proba-
bilistic bisimulation and abstract it via graph-theoretic
methods. This allows us to reduce the search space
and hence considerably optimize the complexity of the
concerned algorithms.
• propose two algorithms to compute Nash Equilibrium
and Social Optimal strategy respectively. The nov-
elty consists in combing graph-theoretic methods with
backward induction, which enables us on the one hand
to increase reuseness and on the other hand to make
the backward induction possible in the setting of some
infinite paths.
Note that our method can filter out invalid Nash Equi-
librium strategies from the results obtained by traditional
game-theoretic methods. For instance, in the example in-
troduced in [12], three Nash Equilibrium strategies obtained
ultimately by game-theoretic approach methods, while only
two of them obtained by our method: we filter out the invalid
Nash Equilibrium strategy from the results in [12]. Note
also our method can be applied to other network security
scenarios. For example, the proposed reactive model can
be extended conservatively to a generative model based on
PVCCS. In this way we provide a uniform framework for
modeling and analyzing network security scenarios which
are usually modeled either via perfect and complete infor-
mation games or via perfect and incomplete games. How-
ever, for the limited space of this paper, we will focus on the
reactive setting for the conciseness and easier understanding
of this work.
In the remaining sections, we shall review some notions
of graph theory and establish the reactive model based on
PVCCS (Section 2); present the formal definitions of NES
and SOS in this model, as well as the corresponding algo-
rithms and their correctness proofs (Section 3); then illus-
trate our method by a case study (Section 4); fianlly, discuss
the conclusion (Section 5). Appendix shows proofs of theo-
rems, tables referred to the case study and a notation index.
2. PRELIMINARIESANDREACTIVEMODEL
BASED ON PVCCS
2.1 Graph theory
We firstly recall some notions of graph theory: Strongly Con-
nected Component (SCC), Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)
and Path Contraction [5, 19, 6].
SCC of an arbitrary directed graph form a partition into
subgraphs that are themselves strongly connected (it is pos-
sible to reach any vertex starting from any other vertex by
traversing edges in the direction).
DAG is a directed graph with no directed cycles. There are
two useful DAG related properties we used in our paper: (1)
if H is a weakly connected graph, H ′ is obtained by viewing
each SCC in H as one vertex, H ′ must be a DAG; (2) if H
is a DAG, H has at least one vertex whose out-degree is 0.
Path Contraction Let e = xy be an edge of a graph
H = (V,E). H/e is a graph (V ′, E′) with vertex set V ′ :=
(V \{x, y}) ∪ {ve}, and edge set E′ := {vw ∈ E | {v, w} ∩
{x, y} = ∅} ∪ {vew | xw ∈ E\{e} or yw ∈ E\{e}} (Figure
1). Path contraction occurs upon the set of edges in a path
that contract to form a single edge between the endpoints
of the path after a series of edge contractions.
Figure 1: Edge contraction
2.2 PVCCSR
PVCCSR is a reactive model for Probabilistic Value-passing
CCS, proposed based on the reactive model for probabilistic
CCS [22].
Syntax: Let A be a set of channel names ranged over by
a, and A be the set of co-names, i.e., A = {a | a ∈ A}, and
a = a by convention. Label = A ∪A. Var is a set of value
variables ranged over by x and Val is a value set ranged
over by v. e and b denote value expression and boolean
expression respectively. The set of actions, ranged over by
α, Act = {a(x) | a ∈ A} ∪ {a(e) | a ∈ A} ∪ {τ}, where τ
is the silent action. K and X are a set of process identifiers
and a set of process variables respectively. Each process
identifier A ∈ K is assigned an arity, a non-negative integer
representing the number of parameters which it takes.
Pr is the set of processes in PVCCSR defined inductively as
follows, where P , Pi are already in Pr:
Pr ::=Nil |
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
[pij]αi.Pij | P1|P2 | P\R
| if b then P1 else P2 | A(x)
α ::=a(x) | a(e)
where a ∈ Label, R ⊆ A. I, J are index sets, and ∀i ∈ I,
pij ∈ (0, 1], ∑˙
j∈I
pij = 1, and αi 6= αj if i 6= j. ∑ and ∑˙ are
summation notations for processes and real numbers respec-
tively. Furthermore, each process constant A(x) is defined
recursively by associating to each identifier an equation of
the form A(x)
def
= P , where P contains no process variables
and no free value variables except x.
Nil is an empty process which does nothing;
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
[pij]αi.Pij
is a summation process with probabilistic choice which means
if performs action αi, Pij will be chosen to be proceed with
probability pij, for example, [0.2]α.P1 + [0.8]α.P2 + [1]β.P3
is a process which will choose process P1 with probability
0.2 and P2 with probability 0.8 if performs action α, or will
choose P3 with probability 1 if performs action β, here αi
stands for an action prefix and there are two kinds of pre-
fixes: input prefix a(x) and output prefix a(e). If J is a
singleton set, then we will omit the probability from the
summation process, such as
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
[1]αi.Pij will be written
as
∑
i∈I
αi.Pi, and if both I and J are singleton sets, then the
summation process is written as α.P ; P1|P2 represents the
combined behavior of P1 and P2 in parallel; P\R is a chan-
nel restriction, whose behavior is like that of P as long as
P does not perform any action with channel a ∈ R ∪ R;
if b then P1 else P2 is a conditional process which enacts P1
if b is true, else P2.
Semantics: The operational semantics of PVCCSR is de-
fined by the rules in Table 1, where P
α[p]→ Q describes a tran-
sition that, by performing an action α, starts from P and
leads to Q with probability p. Mapping chan : Act → A,
i.e., chan(a(x)) = chan(a(e)) = a. And P{e/x} means
substituting e for every free occurrences of x in process P .
By convention, if P1
α[p]→ P2 and P2 β[q]→ P3, then we use
P1
α[p]β[q]
=⇒ P3 to represent multi-step transition.
Probabilistic Bisimulation: We recall the definition of
cumulative probability distribution function (cPDF) [22] which
computes the total probability in which a process derives a
set of processes. ℘ is the powerset operator and we write
Pr/R to denote the set of equivalence classes induced by
equivalence relation R over Pr.
Definition 2.1. µ : (Pr × Act × ℘(Pr)) → [0, 1] is the
total function given by: ∀α ∈ Act, ∀P ∈ Pr, ∀C ⊆ Pr,
µ(P, α,C) =
∑˙{p|P α[p]−→ Q, Q ∈ C}.
Definition 2.2. An equivalence relation R ⊆ Pr × Pr
is a probabilistic bisimulation if (P,Q) ∈ R implies: ∀C ∈
Pr/R, ∀α ∈ Act, µ(P, α,C) = µ(Q,α,C).
P and Q are probabilistic bisimilar, written as P ∼ Q, if
there exists a probabilistic bisimulation R s.t. PRQ.
2.3 Modelling for Network Security based on
PVCCSR
ComModel focuses on modeling the network security sce-
nario modeled usually via perfect and complete information
game: a network system state considers the situations of
attacker, defender and network environment together; the
participants act in turn at each state and the interactions
among the participants will cause the network state transi-
tion with certain probability; each state transition produces
immediate payoff to attacker and defender, and the former
(positive values) is in terms of the extent of damage he does
to the network while the latter (negative values) is mea-
sured by the time of recovery; the future offensive-defensive
behaviors will impact on the action choice of attacker and
defender at each state. Nash Equilibrium strategy repre-
sents a stable plan of action for attacker and defender in
long run, while the Social Optimal strategy is a policy to
minimize the damage caused by attacker.
Assuming S is the set of network system state, ranged over
by si, i ∈ I, I is an index set; action sets of attacker and
defender are Aa and Ad respectively, u, v represent the gen-
eral values, Aa(si) ⊆ Aa is the action set of attacker at si,
as well as Ad(si) ⊆ Ad is that of defender; state transition
probability is a function p˙ : S × Aa × Ad × S → [0, 1], and
immediate payoff associated with each transition is a func-
tion r˙ : S×Aa×Ad → R1×R2, where R is the real number
set, and we use index to distinguish the first and the second
element, and r˙a : S×Aa×Ad → R1 represents the immedi-
ate payoff of attacker, while r˙d : S × Aa × Ad → R2 is that
of defender.
ComModel, a model based on PVCCSR, is used to model-
ing for the network security scenario depicted as above. The
processes represent all possible behaviors of the participants
in network system at each state. Each state is assigned with
a process depicting all possible interactions currently per-
formed among the participants. Then we establish a network
state transition system based on the process transitions.
In ComModel, the channel set A = {Attc,Defd, T ella,
T elld}, Label = A ∪ A ∪ {Log} ∪ {Rec}. The value set
Val = Aa ∪ Ad ∪ T , where T ⊆ R × R. Var is the set
of value variables. Act is the union of behavior sets of the
three participants (Acta,Actd and Actn) defined as follows:
Act =Acta ∪Actd ∪Actn
Acta ={Attc(v) | v ∈ Aa} ∪ {Tella(x) | x ∈ Var}
Actd ={Defd(v) | v ∈ Ad} ∪ {Telld(x) | x ∈ Var}
Actn ={Attc(x) | x ∈ Var} ∪ {Defd(x) | x ∈ Var}
∪ {Tella(x) | x ∈ Var ∪Ad}
∪ {Telld(x) | x ∈ Var ∪Aa}
∪ {Log(x, y) | x ∈ Aa ∪Var, y ∈ Ad ∪Var}.
∪ {Rec(r˙(s, u, v)) | s ∈ S, u ∈ Aa, v ∈ Ad}
Figure 2 shows one interaction among the participants at
state s. Attc(u) means attacker takes attack u, similar
to Defd(v) for defender; Attc(x) (or Defd(x)) means net-
work environment is attacked (or is defended); Telld(x) (or
Tella(x)) means network environment informs defender (or
attacker) the action chosen by attacker (or defender); Telld(x)
(or Tella(x)) means defender (or attacker) is informed that
[In] ∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
[pij]a(x).Pij
a(e)[pij]−→ Pij{e/x}
[Out] ∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
[pij]a(e).Pij
a(e)[pij]−→ Pij
[Res] P
α[p]−→P ′
P\Rα[p]−→P ′\R
(chan(α) /∈ R ∪R) [Con]P{e/x}
α[p]−→P ′
A(e)
α[p]−→P ′
(A(x)
def
= P )
[Parl]
P1
α[p]−→P ′1
P1|P2
α[p]−→P ′1 |P2
[Parr]
P2
α[p]−→P ′2
P1|P2
α[p]−→P1|P ′2
[Com]
P1
a(e)[p]−→ P ′1 , P2
a(e)[q]−→ P ′2
P1|P2
τ[p·q]−→ P ′1 |P
′
2
[Ift]
P1
α[p]−→P ′1
if b then P1 else P2
α[p]−→P ′1
(b = true) [Iff]
P2
α[p]−→P ′2
if b then P1 else P2
α[p]−→P ′2
(b = false)
Table 1: Operational semantics of PVCCSR
attacker defender
u u
vv
Log File 
Private data center
network 
environment
Attc(u) Attc(x)
Defd(y) Defd(v)
Telld(x)Telld(u)
Tella(v)Tella(y) Log(u,v)
Rec(r(s,u,v))
.
Figure 2: Interactions among participants at state s
attack (or defense) has happened; Log(x, y) means the net-
work environment writes the values of x and y into a log
file, where x and y is used to receive the values of attack
and defense respectively; Rec(r˙(s, u, v)) stands for the net-
work environment records the immediate payoff to attacker
and defender if they choose u and v at state s respectively.
The processes describing all possible behaviors of the partic-
ipants at state si, denoted by pAi, pDi and pNi, are defined
as follows:
pAi
def
=
∑
u∈Aa(si)
Attc(u).T ella(y).Nil
pDi
def
= Telld(x).
∑
v∈Ad(si)
Defd(v).Nil
pNi
def
= Attc(x).T elld(x).Defd(y).T ella(y).T ri(x, y)
Tri(x, y)
def
=
∑
u∈Aa(si)
v∈Ad(si)
Log(u, v).(if (x = u, y = v) then
∑
j∈I
[p˙(si, u, v, sj)]Rec(r˙(si, u, v)).(pAj |pDj |pNj)
else Nil)
The process assigned to each state si is defined as
Gi
def
= (pAi|pDi|pNi)\R,R = {Attc,Defd, T ella, T elld}
We get the network state transition system, TS for short,
based on process transitions. Minimizing TS by shrinking
probabilistic bisimilar pairs of states. We conduct a series of
path contractions on TS and obtained a new graph named
as ConTS without information loss as follows:
Definition 2.3. ConTS is a tuple (V,E, L)
• V = {Gi | Gi is the process we assign to state si}
• E = {(Gi, Gj) | ranged over eij, if there exists a multi-
transition Gi
(τ [1])4Log(u,v)[1]Rec(r˙(si,u,v))[p˙(si,u,v,sj)]
=⇒ Gj}
• L(eij) = {(LAct(eij), LTranP(eij), LWeiP(eij) | eij ∈ E}
– action pair: LAct(eij) = (u, v)
∗ LaAct(eij) = u, LdAct(eij) = v
– transition probability: LTranP(eij) = p˙(si, u, v, sj)
– weight pair: LWeiP(eij) = r˙(si, u, v)
∗ LaWeiP(eij) = r˙a(si, u, v)
∗ LdWeiP(eij) = r˙d(si, u, v)
LSWeiP(eij) = L
a
WeiP(eij) + |LdWeiP(eij)| denotes the sum of
absolute weight pair of eij. By convention, in any network
security scenario, for any e, e′ ∈ E, if LaWeiP(e) > LaWeiP(e′)
then LdWeiP(e) < L
d
WeiP(e
′).
3. ANALYZING PROPERTIES AS GRAPH
THEORY APPROACH
We firstly introduce the definitions of Nash Equilibrium strat-
egy (NES) and Social Optimal strategy (SOS) in our model,
and then we illustrate the algorithms proposed to comput
NES and SOS respectively.
3.1 NES and SOS
Definition 3.1. ∀Gi ∈ V , an execution of Gi in ConTS,
denoted by pii, is a walk (vertices and edges appearing alter-
nately) starting from Gi and ending with a cycle, on which
every vertex’s out-degree is 1.
According to the definition of execution, pii is in the form
of GieijGj...(Gk...GlelkGk) which is ended by a cycle starting
with Gk, where Gi and Gk may be the same node. pii can
be written as piei if e is the first edge of pii; pii[j] denotes the
subsequence of pii starting from Gj, where Gj is a vertex on
pii.
Definition 3.2. The payoff to attacker and defender on
execution pii, denoted by PF
a(pii) and PF
d(pii) respectively,
are defined as follows:
PF a(pii) = L
a
WeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · PF a(pii[j])
PF d(pii) = L
d
WeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · PF d(pii[j])
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. The sum of absolute
payoff on pii of attacker and defender is denoted as PF
S(pii),
and PF S(pii) = PF
a(pii) + |PF d(pii)|.
Theorem 3.1. ∀Gi ∈ V , pii is an execution of Gi, PF a(pii)
and PF d(pii) are converged.
Proof. Based on the definition of payoff on an execu-
tion of Gi and limiting laws, we show the proof details for
PF a(pii) in Appendix. The proof for PF
d(pii) is similar.
Nash Equilibrium Execution and Social Optimal Execution
are defined coinductively [18] as follows:
Definition 3.3. pii is Nash Equilibrium Execution (NEE)
of Gi if it satisfies:
PF a(pii) = max
eij∈E′(Gi)
{LaWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · PF a(pij)}
PF d(pii) = max
eij∈Eae (Gi)
{LdWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · PF d(pij)}
where pij is NEE of Gj, e is the first edge of pii, E
a
e (Gi) =
{e′ ∈ E(Gi) | LaAct(e′) = LaAct(e)} including e, and E′(Gi) =
{arg max
e′∈Ea
e′′ (Gi)
{LdWeiP(e′) + β · LTranP(e′) · PF d(pij)}, ∀e′′ ∈
E(Gi)}.
Definition 3.4. pii is Social Optimal Execution (SOE) of
Gi, if it satisfies:
PF S(pii) = min
eij∈E(Gi)
{LSWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · PFS(pij)}
where pij is SOE of Gj
Definition 3.5. Strategy is a sequence consisting of ac-
tion pair (one from attacker and one from defender) at each
state.
Definition 3.6. Nash Equilibrium Strategy (NES) is a strat-
egy of which every Gi’s execution based on is NEE of Gi.
Definition 3.7. Social Optimal Strategy (SOS) is a strat-
egy of which every Gi’s execution based on is SOE of Gi.
3.2 Algorithms
The way to compute NES (or SOS) in ConTS is to find
a spanning subgraph of ConTS satisfying following condi-
tions:
A. Each vertex’s outdegree is 1;
B. Each vertex’s execution in this subgraph is its NEE (or
SOE).
For backward inductive analysis, we firstly find SCC of ConTS
based on Tarjan’s algorithm [5] and construct Abstrac-
tion (Abs for short) by viewing each SCC as one vertex.
V(Abs) denotes the vertex set of Abs ranged over by D.
Abs is a DAG, and we rename D with Leave if its out-degree
is 0, else with Non-Leave. By convention, ∀D ∈ V(Abs),
V(D) = {Gi ∈ V | Gi belongs to the SCC represented by
D}.
Definition 3.8. ∀D ∈ V(Abs), the priority of D, de-
noted by prior(D), is defined inductively:
(1) prior(D) = n, if D is a Leave, and n is the size of
V(Abs).
(2) prior(D) = min{prior(D′)− 1 | D′ is any direct succes-
sor of D in Abs}
Definition 3.9. D depends on D′ if D′ appears in one
of the paths starting from D in Abs.
Theorem 3.2. If prior(D) < prior(D′) then D′ does not
depend on D.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction: if D′ depends on
D, then D appears in one of the paths starting from D′ in
Abs, so we have prior(D′) = min{prior(D′′) − 1 | D′′ is
any direct successor of D′ in Abs} < prior(D), contradic-
tion.
If D does not depend on D′, then computing NES/SOS of
D′ has no impaction on computing NES/SOS of D. To find
NES/SOS of D is to find NEE/SOE of all Gi ∈ V(D).
The algorithms for computing NES and SOS, denoted as
AlgNES() and AlgSOS() respectively, are both based on
backward induction. The framework of AlgNES() is as
follows:
(1) Compute priority of each vertex D in Abs;
(2) Compute NES for Leave firstly, then compute backward
inductively for Non-Leave.
The framework of AlgSOS() is similar.
Pseudo code of AlgNES() is shown in Algorithm 1.
Data: Abs
Result: NES of Abs
NES(Abs)← ∅;
for D ∈ V(Abs) do
prior(D)← ComputePrior(D);
end
List L ← list of V(Abs) in descending order on priority;
pointer p← L;
while p is not the tail of L do
D ← p.data;
while prior(D) is the highest in L do
NES(Abs)∪ ← NESinLeave(D);
p← p.next;
D ← p.data;
end
NES(Abs)∪ ← NESinNonLeave(D);
p← p.next;
D ← p.data;
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudo code of AlgNES()
NES/SOS for Leave
The key point of computing NES (or SOS) for Leave D is to
find a cycle in D satisfying conditions A and B as above.
NES in Leave: The method of finding NES for Leave D is a
value iteration method, denoted as NESinLeave(D). The
value function is BackInd(Gi) which returns some edge e of
Gi and RefN(Gi) is used to refresh the value of the weight
pair for each edge of Gi, ∀Gi ∈ V(D).
As the narrative convenience, we introduce some auxiliary
symbols: ∀e ∈ E(Gi), the weight pair initializes with L0(e) =
LWeiP(e), and Ln(e) = (L
a
n(e), L
d
n(e)) is used to keep the
new weight pair of e obtained by RefN(Gi) on the nth iter-
ation; ∀Gi ∈ V(D), Ppn(Gi) = (Ppan(Gi), Ppdn(Gi)), initial-
ized with Pp0(Gi) = (0, 0), is used to keep Ln(e), where e is
the result of BackInd(Gi) on the nth iteration. The itera-
tive process will be continued until ∀Gi ∈ V(D), Ppn(Gi) =
Ppn+1(Gi).
The framework of NESinLeave(D) is as follows:
(1) Value iteration initializes with BackInd(Gi), where for
each Gi ∈ V(D), the weight pair of e ∈ E(Gi) is L0(e).
Assuming e is the result obtained by BackInd(Gi), then
Pp0(Gi) = L0(e);
(2) Loops through the method RefN(Gi) and BackInd(Gi)
by order until ∀Gi, Ppn+1(Gi) = Ppn(Gi);
(3) ∀Gi, execute BackInd(Gi). The cycle obtained is what
we want.
Rules of method BackInd(Gi) on the nth iteration, n ≥ 0:
(1) Let E′ = E(Gi);
(2) If ∃e1, e2 ∈ E′ satisfying LaAct(e1) = LaAct(e2), refresh E′
by filtering the edge e 6= arg max
e∈{e1,e2}
Ldn(e);
(3) Refresh E′ by keeping edge e = arg max
e∈E′
Lan(e)
(4) Return e.
Rules in method RefN(Gi) on the (n+1)th iteration, n ≥ 0:
(1) ∀e ∈ E(Gi), compute its Ln+1(e) componentwise by fol-
lowing formula:
Ln+1(eij) = LWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Ppn(Gj)
(2) Keep Ln+1(eij), ∀eij ∈ E(Gi);
Pseudo code of NESinLeave(), BackInd() and RefN()
are shown in Algorithm 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
Data: Leave of Abs: D
Result: NES of D
Label Gi ∈ V(D) with NonConducted;
NES(D)← ∅;
while ∃Gi is NonConducted do
e← BackInd(Gi);
Pp0(Gi)← L0(e);
Label Gi with Conducted;
end
while ∃Gi Ppn(Gi) 6= Ppn+1(Gi) componentwise do
RefN(Gi) ;
e← BackInd(Gi);
Ppn+1(Gi)← Ln+1(e);
end
NES(D)← {e|e← BackInd(Gi), Gi ∈ V(D)};
Algorithm 2: Pseudo code of NESinLeave()
Data: Gi ∈ V(D)
Result: edge e ∈ E(Gi)
create E′ ← E(Gi);
while ∀e1, e2 ∈ E′ with LaAct(e1) = LaAct(e2) do
E′ ← E′\{e | e 6= argmax
e∈{e1,e2}
{Ldn(e)}};
end
e← argmax
e∈E′
{Lan (e)};
return e;
Algorithm 3: Pseudo code of BackInd()
Data: Gi ∈ V(D)
Result: Ln+1(eij), ∀eij ∈ E(Gi)
Label all eij ∈ E(Gi) with NonRef;
while ∃eij is NonRef do
Lan+1(eij)← LaWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Ppan (Gj);
Ldn+1(eij)← LdWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Ppdn(Gj);
Label eij with Ref;
end
Algorithm 4: Pseudo code of RefN()
SOS in Leave: The method SOSinLeave(D) used to find
SOS for Leave D is also a value iteration method. The value
function is LocSoOp(Gi) which returns some edge e of Gi
and RefS(Gi) is used to refresh the absolute sum value of
the weight pair for each edge of Gi, ∀Gi ∈ V(D).
Here are some other auxiliary symbols for convenience: ∀e ∈
E(Gi), its sum of absolute weight pair initializes with L
S
0(e) =
LSWeiP(e), and L
S
n(e) is used to keep the new sum of absolute
weight pair of e obtained by RefS(Gi) on the nth iteration;
Psn(Gi) initialized with Ps0(Gi) = 0, is used to keep L
S
n(e),
where e is the result of LocSoOp(Gi) on the nth iteration.
The iterative process will be continued until ∀Gi ∈ V(D),
Psn(Gi) = Psn+1(Gi).
The framework of SOSinLeave(D) is as follows:
(1) Value iteration initializes with LocSoOp(Gi), where for
Gi ∈ V(D), the sum of absolute weight pair of e ∈ E(Gi) is
LS0(e). Assuming the result obtained by LocSoOp(Gi) is e,
then Ps0(Gi) = L
S
0(e);
(2) Loops through the method RefS(Gi) and LocSoOp(Gi)
by order until ∀Gi, Psn+1(Gi) = Psn(Gi);
(3) ∀Gi, execute LocSoOp(Gi). The cycle obtained is what
we want.
Rules of method LocSoOp(Gi) on nth iteration, n ≥ 0:
(1) Compare LSn(e), ∀e ∈ E(Gi);
(2) Return edge e = arg min
e∈E(Gi)
{LSn(e)}.
Rules of method RefS(Gi) on (n+1)th iteration, n ≥ 0:
(1) ∀eij ∈ E(Gi), compute its LSn+1(eij) by following formula:
LSn+1(eij) = L
S
WeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Psn(Gj)
(2) Keep LSn+1(eij), ∀e ∈ E(Gi);
Pseudo code of SOSinLeave(), LocSoOp() and RefS()
are given in Algorithm 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
NES/SOS for Non-Leave
NES of Non-Leave: For Non-Leave vertex D in Abs, the
method of computing its NES is NESinNonLeave(D) and
its framework is as follows:
Data: Leave of Abs: D
Result: SOS of D
Label Gi ∈ V(D) with NonConducted;
SOS(D)← ∅;
while ∃Gi is NonConducted do
e← LocSoOp(Gi);
Ps0(Gi)← LS0 (e);
Label Gi with Conducted;
end
while ∃Gi Psn(Gi) 6= Psn+1(Gi) do
RefS(Gi) ;
e← LocSoOp(Gi);
Psn+1(Gi)← LSn+1(e);
end
SOS(D)← {e|e← LocSoOp(Gi), Gi ∈ V(D)};
Algorithm 5: Pseudo code of SOSinLeave()
Data: Gi ∈ V(D)
Result: edge e ∈ E(Gi)
while ∃e ∈ E(Gi) is not compared do
e′ ← argmin
e∈E
{LSn (e)};
end
return e′;
Algorithm 6: Pseudo code of LocSoOp()
Data: Gi ∈ V(D)
Result: LSn+1(eij), ∀eij ∈ E(Gi)
Label all eij ∈ Gi with NonRef;
while ∃eij is NonRef do
LSn+1(eij)← LSWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Psn(Gj);
Label eij with Ref;
end
Algorithm 7: Pseudo code of RefS()
(1) if the size of V(D) is more than 1, we will pre-process
D with method PrePro(D) firstly, then get its NES by
NESinLeave(D);
(2) if V(D) = {Gi} for some Gi ∈ V , then the NES of D is
the result obtained from BackInd(Gi) directly.
Rules in method PrePro(D) are as follows:
(1) D′ is one direct successor of D in Abs, and if the edge
e connecting D and D′ is contributed by the connection be-
tweenGi ∈ V(D) andGj ∈ V(D′), then L0(eij) = LWeiP(eij)+
β ·LTranP(eij) ·PF (pij) componentwise, where pij is the nash
equilibrium execution of Gj;
(2) Change e to be the self-loop edge of Gi.
Pseudo code of NESinNonLeave() and PrePro() are shown
in Algorithm 8 and Algorithm 9 respectively.
Data: Non-Leave: D
Result: NES of D
NES(D)← ∅;
if the size of V(D) is bigger than 1 then
D′ ← PrePro(D);
NES(D)←NESinLeave(D′);
else
NES(D)←BackInd(Gi), if V(D) = {Gi};
end
Algorithm 8: Pseudo code of NESinNonLeave()
SOS of Non-Leave: The method SOSinNonLeave(D)
computing SOS for Non-Leave D is identical to NESin-
NonLeave(D) except for the preprocessing method Pre-
ProS(D). The computing steps of PreProS(D) are as fol-
Data: Non-Leave: D
Result: new D′
E′ ← E(Gi), Gi ∈ V(D);
while ∃eij ∈ E′ with endpoint Gj /∈ V(D) do
La0 (eij)← LaWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Ppa(Gj);
Ld0(eij)← LdWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Ppd(Gj);
Change eij to be self-loop edge of Gi;
end
D′ ← (V(D), E′);
Return D′;
Algorithm 9: Pseudo code of PrePro()
lows:
(1) D′ is one direct successor of D in Abs, if the edge e
connecting D and D′ is contributed by connection between
Gi ∈ V(D) and Gj ∈ V(D′), then LS0 (eij) = LSWeiP(eij) + β ·
LTranP(eij) ·PFS(pij), where pij is social optimal execution of
Gj;
(2) Change e to be self-loop edge of Gi.
Pseudo code of SOSinNonLeave() and PreProS() is shown
in Algorithm 10 and Algorithm 11 respectively in Appendix.
Data: Non-Leave: D
Result: SOS of D
SOS(D)← ∅;
if the size of V(D) is bigger than 1 then
D′ ← PreProS(D);
SOS(D)←SOSinLeave(D′);
else
SOS(D)←LocSoOp(Gi), if V(D) = {Gi};
end
Algorithm 10: Pseudo code of SOSinNonLeave()
Data: Non-Leave: D
Result: new D′
E′ ← E(Gi), Gi ∈ V(D);
while ∃eij ∈ E′ with endpoint Gj /∈ V(D) do
LS0 (eij)← LSWeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · Ps(Gj);
Change eij to be self-loop edge of Gi;
end
D′ ← (V(D), E′);
Return D′;
Algorithm 11: Pseudo code of PreProS()
3.3 Correctness of Algorithms
Correctness of NESinLeave()
Inspired by a technique in dynamic programming which is
called value-iteration [23, 20], BackInd(D) is formalized as
a mapping σ : V(D) → R × R, on kth iteration, σk(Gi) =
(σk(Gi)
a, σk(Gi)
d) = Ppk(Gi). RefN() defines a set of
vertex {Gi(σk) | Gi(σk) denotes Gi with eij whose weight
pair is refreshed by the rule componentwise: Lk+1(eij) =
LWeiP(eij) + β ·LTranP(eij) · σk(Gj)}. According to the rules
of NESinLeave(D), σk+1(Gi) = Pp1(Gi(σk)) for any Gi ∈
V(D). It is convenient to define the shorthand operator no-
tation (Tσ)(Gi) = Pp1(Gi(σ)), that is Tσk = σk+1.
Lemma 3.1. For any Gi ∈ V(D), we have
| σk(Gi)a − Tσk(Gi)a |≤ max
e∈E(Gi)
| Lak(e)− Lak+1(e) |
| σk(Gi)d − Tσk(Gi)d |≤ max
e∈E(Gi)
| Ldk(e)− Ldk+1(e) |
Proof. We prove by contradiction for the first inequality
in details. According to the rules in BackInd(Gi), we need
to consider all possible results obtained by BackInd(Gi)
on kth and (k+1)th iteration respectively. The details are
shown in Appendix. The proof for the second inequality is
similar.
Lemma 3.2. T is a contraction.
Proof. For any real vector −→x ∈ RJ , J is an index set,
let || −→x ||∞= maxj |xj |. According to Lemma 3.1, then we
have
|| Tσak+1 − Tσak ||∞ = max
Gi∈V
| Tσk+1(Gi)a − Tσk(Gi)a |
≤ max
Gi∈V
max
eij∈E(Gi)
| Lak+2(eij)− Lak+1(eij) |
≤ max
Gj∈V
β· | σk+1(Gj)a − σk(Gj)a |
= β· || σak+1 − σak ||∞
similar proof for || Tσdk+1 − Tσdk ||∞≤ β· || σdk+1 − σdk ||∞.
Therefore, we claim that ∃σ∗, satisfying Tσ∗ = σ∗.
Theorem 3.3. If D is a Leave of Abs, then the result
obtained by NESinLeave(D) is NES of D.
Proof. We need to prove two issues:
1. NESinLeave(D) is terminated.
2. The execution of Gi, ∀Gi ∈ V(D), based on the result of
NESinLeave(D) is its nash equilibrium execution.
The details are shown in Appendix.
Correctness of SOSinLeave()
The way to prove the correctness of SOSinLeave() is sim-
ilar to that of NESinLeave(). We will give the outline of
the proofs.
We can formalize LocSoOp(D) as a mapping α′ : V(D)→
R, so on kth iteration, we have σ′k(Gi) = Psk(Gi). RefS()
defines a set of vertex {Gi(σ′k) | Gi(σ′k) denotes Gi with eij
whose sum of absolute weight pair is refreshed by the rule:
LSk+1(eij) = L
S
WeiP(eij) + β · LTranP(eij) · σ′k(Gj)}. Accord-
ing to the rules of SOSinLeave(D), for any Gi ∈ V(D),
σ′k+1(Gi) = Ps1(Gi(σ
′
k)). It is convenient to define another
shorthand operator notation (T ′σ′)(Gi) = Ps1(Gi(σ′)), that
is T ′σ′k = σ
′
k+1. By the same way as Lemma 3.1 and Lemma
3.2, we can prove operator T ′ is a contraction.
Lemma 3.3. For any Gi ∈ V(D), we have
| σ′k(Gi)− T ′σ′k(Gi) |≤ max
e∈E(Gi)
| LSk (e)− LSk+1(e) |
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.4. T ′ is a contraction.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.2.
Theorem 3.4. If D is a Leave of Abs, then the result
obtained by SOSinLeave(D) is SOS of D.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.3.
Correctness of AlgNES() and AlgSOS()
Theorem 3.5. The results obtained from AlgNES(Abs)
and AlgSOS(Abs) are NES and SOS of Abs respectively.
Proof. We prove the correctness of AlgNES(Abs) in
details. Prove inductively on priority of vertex D in Abs.
(1) If D is a Leave, we need to prove the result of NESin-
Leave(D) is NES of D, according to Theorem 3.3, trivial;
(2) For Non-LeaveD, and we assume prior(D) = prior(D′)−
1, by induction hypothesis, D′ has got its NES by Al-
gNES(). If V(D) = {Gi} for some Gi ∈ V , according to
the definition of NEE and rules of BackInd(), the proof is
trivial; if the size of V(D) is bigger than 1, according to the
theorem 3.3, trivial.
4. CASE STUDY
The details of the example we used can be found in [12]. It
shows a local network connected to Internet (see Figure 3).
By the assumption that the firewall is unreliable, and the op-
erating system on the machine is insufficiently hardened, the
attacker has chance to pretend as a root user in web server
and steal or damage data stored in private file server and
private workstation. The state set S of example is shown in
Figure 3: Case study
Table 3; Aa, Ad is given in Table 5 and Table 4 respectively;
for convenience, we will mostly refer to the states and ac-
tions using their symbolic number; state transition probabil-
ity is shown in Table 7, in which p˙(s1, 1, 2, s1) = P (1|1, 1, 2);
the immediate payoff to attacker and defender at each state
is shown in Table 6, in which r˙a(s1, 2, ·) = R1(1, 2, ·) and
r˙d(s1, 2, ·) = R2(1, 2, ·), where · means any action available
at current state.
4.1 Modeling for Case study
We modeling for state s1 in ComModel as example, then
we have pA1, pD1, pN1 as follows:
pA1
def
=
∑
u∈Aa(s1)
Attc(u).T elld(y).Nil
pD1
def
=Tella(x).
∑
v∈Ad(s1)
Defd(v).Nil
pN1
def
=Attc(x).T ella.Defd(y).T ella.T r1(x, y)
Tr1(x, y)
def
=
∑
u∈Aa(s1)
v∈Ad(s1)
Log(u, v).(if (x = u, y = v) then
∑
j∈I
[p˙(si, u, v, sj)]Rec(r˙(si, u, v)).(pAj |pDj |pNj)
else Nil)
We find three pairs of states which are probabilistic bisimi-
lar: s13 ∼ s15, s14 ∼ s16 and s17 ∼ s18. Figure 4 shows the
ConTS of case study.
G1
G6
G2 G3G5
G4
G8
G7 G9
(1,*,0.3,(10,-10))
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,1,1,(0.-10))
(1,1,1,(20.-20))
(1,1,1,(99.-99))     (3,1,1,(0,-10))
G1 G10 G12
G13
(3,1,1,(10,-10))
(2,3,1,(0,0))
(*,2/3,0.9,(0,0))
G14 G17
(2,*,0.3,(50,-50))
(*,1,1,(30,-30))
(*,1,1,(20,-20))
G11
(*,1,1,(30,-60))
(*,1,1, (0,-90))
(*,2/3, 0.9, (0,0))
(*,1, 1, (999,-999))
(1,2/3,1,(60.-60)
(1,1,0.5,(30,-10))
(1,2,0.1,(10,-10))
(3,*,0.3,(0,0))
(2/3,*,1,(0,0))
(1,2,0.5,(0,-10))
(1,3,0.5,(0,-20))
(1,2,0.5,(0,-10))
(1,3,0.5,(0,-20))
(2/3,1,(0,-10))
(1,2/3,1,(10,-10))
(1,3,0.8,(99,-99))
(1,2,0.8,(50,-99))
(2,3,0.8,(10,-10))
(1,3,0.8,(10,-10))
(1,2,0.8,(0,0))
(2/3,3,1,(0,0))
(*,1,1,(0,-99))
(1,*,0.3,(30,-30))
(*,2/3,0.8,(0,0))
(*,2/3,0.8(0,0))
(2/3,1,1,(0,-20))      (1,1,0.5,(30,-10))
(*,*, 1, (0,0))
Figure 4: ConTS of Example
4.2 Analyzing NES/SOS for Case study
We implement the algorithms using Java in Eclipse develop-
ment environment on machine with 3.4GHz Inter(R) Core(TM)
i72.99G RAM. We get two Nash Equlibrium Strategies and
one Social Optimal strategy for our case study, shown in
Figure 5, 6, 7 respectively.
G1
G6
G2 G3G5
G4
G8
G7 G9
(1,*,0.3,(10,-10))
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,1,1,(0.-10))
(1,1,1,(20.-20))
(1,1,1,(99.-99))
G1 G10 G12
G13
(3,1,1,(10,-10))
(*,2/3,0.9,(0,0))
G14 G17
(2,*,0.3,(50,-50))
(*,1,1,(30,-30))
(*,1,1,(20,-20))
G11
(*,1,1,(30,-60))
(*,1,1, (0,-90))
(*,2/3, 0.9, (0,0))
(*,1, 1, (999,-999))
(1,2,1,60.-60) (*,*, 1, (0,0))
Figure 5: Nash Equilibrium strategy 1
4.3 Evaluation
G1
G6
G2 G3G5
G4
G8
G7 G9
(1,*,0.3,(10,-10))
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,1,1,(20,-20))(1,1,1,(99.-99))
G1 G10 G12
G13
(2,3,1,(0,0))
(*,2/3,0.9,(0,0))
G14 G17
(2,*,0.3,(50,-50))
(*,1,1,(30,-30))
(*,1,1,(20,-20))
G11
(*,1,1,(30,-60))
(*,1,1, (0,-90))
(*,2/3, 0.9, (0,0))
(*,1, 1, (999,-999))
(1,2,1,60.-60)
(*,*, 1, (0,0))
(1,2,0.5,(0.-10))
(1,2,0.5,(0.-10))
(2,3,1,(0,0))
Figure 6: Nash Equilibrium strategy 2
G1
G6
G2 G3G5
G4
G8
G7 G9
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,*,0.18,(0,0))
(1,1,1,(20.-20))
G1 G10 G12
G13 G14 G17
(2,*,0.3,(50,-50))
(*,1,1,(20,-20))
G11
(*,2/3, 0.8, (0,0))
(*,1,1,(30,-60))
(*,1,1, (0,-90))
(*,1, 1, (999,-999)) (1,2/3,1, (60,-60))
(*,*, 1, (0,0))
(1,2,0.3,(10,-10))(2,*,0.18,(0,0))
(3,1,1,(0,-10))
(1,3,0.8,(99,-99))
(*,1,1,(0,-99))
(1,3,0.5,(0,-20))
(1,3,0.8,10,-10)
Figure 7: Social Optimal strategy
We compare our results with those obtained in [12] by game-
theoretic approach:
(1) We filter the invalid Nash Equilibrium strategy from the
results in [12]. We filter the action pair (φ, Remove Sniffer
Detecor) at state s3 and the action pair (Instrall Sniffer
Detector, Remove Compromised account restart ftpd) at s6
which obtained in the second Nash Equilibrium strategy in
[12] but have no practical state transition.
(2) We minimize the state space by probabilistic bisimu-
lation while [12] focuses on the whole state set. Time con-
sumed to compute Nash Equilibrium strategy and Social Op-
timal strategy for this example with our approach is shown
in Table 2. Although it is incomparable with the time con-
sumed in [12] because of evaluating on different machine
models, our approach should be faster theoretically.
ComModel Nash Equilibrium Social Optimal
Creation strategy strategy
2.8s 3.7s 1.4s
Table 2: Time consumed for example with our ap-
proach
5. CONCLUSION
We proposed a probabilistic value-passing CCS (PVCCS)
approach for modeling and analyzing a typical network se-
curity scenario with one attacker and one defender which is
usually modeled by perfect and complete information game.
Extention of this method might provide uniform framework
for modelling and analyzing network security scenarios which
are usually modeled via different games. We designed two
algorithms for computing Nash Equilibrium strategy and So-
cial Optimal strategy based on this PVCCS approach and
on graph-theoretic methods. Advantages of these algorithms
are also discussed.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS OF THEOREMS
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. As vertex set V is finite, then any infinite execu-
tion pii of Gi is in form of Giei1G1...(Gk...G(k+m)e(k+m)kGk)
which means ending with a cycle starting with Gk, and m is
the number of vertex on this cycle except Gk, then we have
PF a(pii) = L
a
WeiP(ei1) + β · PF a(pii[1])
= LaWeiP(ei1) + ...+ β
k · PF a(pii[k])
= A+ βk · PF a(pii[k])
where A = LaWeiP(ei1) + ...+ β
k−1 · LaWeiP(e(k-1)k)
PF a(pii[k]) = L
a
WeiP(ek(k+1)) + ...+ β
m · LaWeiP(e(k+m)k)
+ βm+1 ·B + β2m+2 ·B + ...
= (B · 1− β
(m+1)h
1− β(m+1) )h→∞
where B = LaWeiP(ek(k+1)) + ...+ β
m · LaWeiP(e(k+m)k)
lim
h→∞
PF a(pii) = lim
h→∞
(A+ βk(B · 1− β
(m+1)h
1− β(m+1) ))
= A+ βk ·B · lim
h→∞
(
1− β(m+1)h
1− β(m+1) )
= A+B · β
k
1− β(m+1)
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Assuming without loss of generality, σk(Gi) =
(Lk(e1)
a, Lk(e1)
d) and Tσk(Gi) = (Lk+1(e2)
a, Lk+1(e2)
d),
where e1, e2 ∈ E(Gi). Let Lak(e1) = a, Lak(e2) = b, Lak+1(e1) =
a′ and Lak+1(e2) = b
′, where a, a′, b, b′ are positive number.
case 1: LaAct(e1) = L
a
Act(e2)
According to the rules of BackInd(), we have a < b and
b′ < a′. If the first inequality in lemma doesn’t hold, then
we have | a−b′ |>| a−a′ | and | a−b′ |>| b−b′ |, then we get
(b′− a′)(b′+ a′) > 2a(b′− a′) and (a− b)(a+ b) > 2b′(a− b)
which deduce a− b > a′ − b′, contradiction.
case 2: LaAct(e1) 6= LaAct(e2)
Let us define two conditions:
Cond 1: on kth iteration, e2 is kept by step (2) of BackInd().
Cond 2: on (k+1)th iteration, e1 is kept by step (2) of
BackInd().
There are four subcases to be considered:
case 2.1: both Cond 1 and Cond 2
According to the rules of BackInd(), we have a > b and
b′ > a′. If | a − b′ |>| a − a′ | and | a − b′ |>| b − b′ |, then
we get b− a > b′ − a′, contradiction.
case 2.2: not Cond 2 but Cond 1
According to the rules of BackInd(), ∃e′ with LaAct(e′) =
LaAct(e1). Assuming L
a
k(e
′) = c and Lak+1(e
′) = c′, then we
have c > a > b, a′ > c′ and b′ > c′. If | a− b′ |>| a−a′ | and
| a−b′ |>| b−b′ |, then we have (b′−a′)(b′+a′) > 2a(b′−a′)
and a + b > 2b′. If b′ > a′ > c′, it is trivial to get contra-
diction; If c′ < b′ < a′, then we have 2b′ < b′ + a′ < 2a and
2c > a + b > 2b′ > 2c′, then we have b′ < a and c > c′. If
| a−b′ |>| c−c′ |, then we have a−c > b′−c′, contradiction;
If b′ = a′, contradiction.
case 2.3: not Cond 1 but Cond 2
According to the rules of BackInd(), ∃e′ with LaAct(e′) =
LaAct(e2). proof is similar to case 2.2.
case 2.4: neither Cond 1 nor Cond 2
According to the rules of BackInd(), ∃e′, e′′ with LaAct(e′) =
LaAct(e1) and L
a
Act(e
′′) = LaAct(e2). Assuming L
a
k(e
′) = c
and Lak+1(e
′) = c′,Lak(e
′′) = d and Lak+1(e
′′) = d′, then we
have d < a < c, d < b, a′ > c′ and c′ < b′ < d′. If
| a − b′ |>| a − a′ | and | a − b′ |>| b − b′ |, then we have
(b′−a′)(b′+a′) > 2a(b′−a′) and (a− b)(a+ b) > 2b′(a− b).
If a > b and a′ > b′, then we have c′ < c and a > b′, and if
| a − b′ |>| c − c′ |, then we a − c > b′ − c′, contradiction;
If a < b and a′ > b′ or a > b and a′ < b′, it is trivial to get
contradiction; If a < b and a′ < b′, then we get d′ > d and
a < b′, and if | a− b′ |>| d−d′ |, then we get b′−d′ > a−d,
contradiction.
Proof for second inequality is similar. We skip the details.
Proof for Theorem 3.3.
Proof. We need to prove two issues:
1. NESinLeave(D) is terminated.
The way to prove termination of NESinLeave(D) is to
prove ∃k that after kth iteration, ∀Gi, Ppk(Gi) = Ppk+1(Gi).
According to Lemma 3.2, trivial;
2. The result of NESinLeave(D) is NES ofD. ∀Gi ∈ V(D),
assuming pii whose first edge is e is the execution of Gi
based on the result obtained by NESinLeave(D), we need
to prove piei is NEE of Gi coinductively. As pi
e
i is ended by a
cycle, we just need to prove any e′ on piei , e
′ ∈ E(Gj), is the
first edge of NEE of Gj. We prove edge e of Gi as exam-
ple. If piei is not NEE of Gi, according to the definition of
NEE, there exists pie
′
i satisfying: (1) PF
d(pie
′
i ) > PF
d(piei )
where LaAct(e
′) = LaAct(e) or (2) PF
a(pie
′
i ) > PF
a(piei ) where
e′ = arg max
e′′∈Ea(Gi,e′)
PF d(pie
′′
i ), and both of them are con-
tradicted with the rules in BackInd().
B. TABLES OF CASE STUDY
To make paper self-contained, we list the data related in
example created in [12].
State number State name
1 Normal operation
2 Httpd attacked
3 Ftp attacked
4 Ftpd attackeddetector
5 Httpd hacked
6 Ftpd hacked
7 Website defaced
8 Websever sniffer
9 Websever sniffer detector
10 Websever DOS 1
11 Websever DOS 2
12 Network shutdown
13 Filesever hacked
14 Filesever data stolen
15 Workstation hacked
16 Workstation data stolen 1
17 Filesever data stolen
18 Workstation data stolen 2
Table 3: Network state
State no.\ 1 2 3
Action no.
1 φ φ φ
2 φ φ φ
3 Install Sniffer φ φ
Detctor
4 Remove Sniffer φ φ
Detctor
5 Remove Compromised Install sniffer φ
account restart httpd detector
6 Remove Compromised Install sniffer φ
account restart ftpd detector
7 Restore website remove φ φ
compromised account
8 φ φ φ
9 Remove sniffer and φ φ
Compromised account
10 Remove virus and φ φ
Compromised account
11 Remove virus and φ φ
Compromised accoun
12 Remove virus and φ φ
Compromised account
13 φ φ φ
14 Remove sniffer and φ φ
Compromised account
15 φ φ φ
16 Remove sniffer and φ φ
Compromised account
17 φ φ φ
18 φ φ φ
Table 4: Defender’s action set
State no.\ 1 2 3
Action no.
1 Attack httpd Attackf tpd φ
2 Continue φ φ
attacking
3 Continue φ φ
attacking
4 Continue φ φ
attacking
5 Deface Install φ
website sniffer
6 Install φ φ
sniffer
7 φ φ φ
8 Run DOS Crack fileserver Crack workstation
virus root password root password
9 φ φ φ
10 φ φ φ
11 φ φ φ
12 φ φ φ
13 Capture φ φ
data
14 Shutdown φ φ
network
15 Capture φ φ
data
16 Shutdown φ φ
network
17 φ φ φ
18 φ φ φ
Table 5: Attacker’s action set
R1(1) =
10 10 1010 10 10
0 0 0
 R2(1) = −R1(1)
R1(2) =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(2) = R1(2)
R1(3) =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(3) =
−10 −10 −20−10 −10 0
−10 −10 0

R1(4) =
20 10 100 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(4) =
−20 −10 −10−10 0 0
−10 0 0

R1(5) =
99 50 9910 0 10
0 10 0
 R2(5) =
−99 −99 −9910 10 −10
−10 −10 0

R1(6) =
 0 0 1010 0 0
10 0 0
 R2(6) = −R1(6)
R1(7) =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(7) =
−99 0 0−99 0 0
−99 0 0

R1(8) =
30 30 3050 50 50
50 50 50
 R2(8) = −R1(8)
R1(9) =
−20 0 0−20 0 0
−20 0 0
 R2(9) = R1(9)
R1(10) =
30 0 030 0 0
30 0 0
 R2(10) = −R1(10)
R1(11) =
30 0 030 0 0
30 0 0
 R2(11) =
−60 0 0−60 0 0
−60 0 0

R1(12) =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(12) =
−90 0 0−90 0 0
−90 0 0

R1(13) =
999 0 0999 0 0
999 0 0
 R2(13) = −R1(13)
R1(14) =
30 60 600 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(14) =
−10 −60 −60−20 0 0
−20 0 0

R1(15) =
999 0 0999 0 0
999 0 0
 R2(15) = −R1(13)
R1(16) =
30 60 600 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(16) =
−10 −60 −60−20 0 0
−20 0 0

R1(17) =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(17) = R1(17)
R1(18) =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 R2(18) = R1(18)
Table 6: Immediate payoff to Attacker and De-
fender
State 1 State 2 State 3
p(2|1, 1, ·) = 1/3 p(2|2, 1, ·) = 0.5/3 p(3|3, 1, 2) = 0.5
p(3|1, 1, 2) = 1/3 p(5|2, 1, ·) = 0.5/3 p(3|3, 1, 3) = 0.5
p(1|1, 3, ·) = 1/3 p(1|2, 2, ·) = 1 p(6|3, 1, 2) = 0.5
p(1|2, 3, ·) = 1 p(6|3, 1, 3) = 0.5
p(4|3, 1, 1) = 1
State 4 State 5 State 6
p(1|4, 2, 1) = 1 p(7|5, 1, 3) = 0.8 p(8|6, 1, 3) = 0.8
p(1|4, 3, 1) = 1 p(8|5, 2, 3) = 0.8 p(9|6, 1, 2) = 0.8
p(3|4, 1, 1) = 1 p(9|5, 1, 2) = 0.8 p(1|6, 2, 3) = 1
p(4|4, 1, 2) = 1 p(1|5, 3, 1) = 1 p(1|6, 3, 1) = 1
p(4|4, 1, 3) = 1 p(1|5, 1, 1) = 1 p(6|6, 2, 3) = 1
p(6|6, 3, 3) = 1
State 7 State 8 State 9
p(1|7, ·, 1) = 1 p(10|8, 1, ·) = 1/3 p(1|9, ·, 1) = 1
p(7|7, ·, 2) = 0.9 p(13|8, 2, ·) = 0.3
p(7|7, ·, 3) = 0.9 p(15|8, 3, ·) = 0.3
State 10 State 11 State 12
p(1|10, ·, 1) = 1 p(1|11, ·, 1) = 1 p(1|12, 1, ·) = 1
p(11|10, ·, 2) = 0.8 p(12|11, ·, 2) = 0.8 p(12|12, ·, 2) = 0.9
p(11|10, ·, 3) = 0.8 p(12|11, ·, 3) = 0.8 p(12|12, ·, 3) = 0.9
State 13 State 14 State 15
p(14|13, 1, ·) = 1 p(12|14, 1, 2) = 1 p(16|15, 1, ·) = 1
p(12|14, 1, 3) = 1
p(17|14, 2, 1) = 1
p(17|14, 3, 1) = 1
p(12|14, 1, 1) = 0.5
p(17|14, 1, 1) = 0.5
State 16 State 17 State 18
p(12|16, 1, 2) = 1 p(17|17, ·, ·) = 0.9 p(18|18, ·, ·) = 0.9
p(12|16, 1, 3) = 1
p(18|16, 2, 1) = 1
p(18|16, 3, 1) = 1
p(12|16, 1, 1) = 0.5
p(18|16, 1, 1) = 0.5
Table 7: State transition probabilities
C. NOTATION INDEX
Abs, 5 NESinNonLeave(), 7
AlgNES(), 5 PFa(pii), 4
AlgSOS(), 5 PF d(pii), 4
BackInd(), 6 Ppn(Gi), 6
ComModel, 3 Psn(Gi), 6
ConTS, 4 PrePro(), 7
D, 5 PreProS(), 7
execution, 4 PVCCSR, 2
Ln(e), 6 RefN(), 6
LSn(e), 6 RefS(), 6
Leave, 5 SOE, 5
LocSoOp(), 6 SOS, 5
NEE, 5 SOSinLeave(), 6
NES, 5 SOSinNonLeave(), 7
NESinLeave(), 6 V(D), 5
